We compared the governance of flood risk in England and the Netherlands, focusing on the general policies, instruments used and underlying principles. Both physical and political environments are important in explaining how countries evolved towards very different rationales of resilience.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last few centuries societies have developed specific views on the governance of the public domain, especially with regard to the involvement and interrelationships of state, market and civil society (Arato & Cohen ; Edwards ) . This has been accompanied by substantive and procedural principles related to decision-making and the specific roles of basic institutions in governance. Governance, however, is not only undertaken through social interaction, it also expresses and articulates existing social and institutional relationships or it creates new social relationships. This articulation is both through how decisions are made, but also by who acts and who has the responsibility for acting. One challenge of governance is the need to respond to the natural environment both to cope with and adapt to natural variability, including trend changes, such as climate change. Climate change creates new or increased risks that produce new governance dilemmas, and thereby tests existing and well-known principles case when we compare adaptation in different countries.
Although the academic literature seems to suggest the possibility of 'universal' templates in resilience strategies (e.g., creating reflexive strategies, embracing variety, having back-up options, stimulating participation, etc.), we would like to stress that there is neither one straightforward application of a resilient strategy for societies nor one resilient socio-ecological system. What is considered a resilient system is, at least in part, dependent on existing social relationships or the 'social contract' (Adger et In this contribution, we compare basic governance approaches in two countries, England and the Netherlands.
In both countries, adaptation to climate change and related flood risks is considered highly relevant. Yet each has clearly different governance approaches which might reveal the prioritisation of other governance principles in the face of climate change. We will focus on topics related to flood risk management to make this comparison more fruitful and balanced and to be able to compare principles in similar policy domains. Our argument is that, in brief, the concept of resilience is different for English society and governance compared to Dutch society and governance. Different political theories evolved historically into a specific arrangement for water management and climate change, which provided different rationales for the role and interrelationships of the basic institutional spheres or mechanisms, in the common shorthand the state, market and civil society -the latter in the case of flood risks may refer to different models, the involvement of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (such as WWF) or other organised groups, institutions of participatory democracy, communities as well as the direct involvement of the local citizens within flood risk management -and these, in turn, influenced the basic principles and instruments in policy and governance. 
THEORY ON RESILIENCE AND METHODS
The concept of resilience stems from biology and was introduced more widely by Holling to understand the dynamics of ecosystems, especially their capacity to persist in some original state while being subjected to all kinds of environ- that resilience is 'the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure and feedbacks, and therefore identity, that is, the capacity to change in order to maintain the same identity' (Folke et al. Table 1 ). In this line of reasoning we must distinguish between 'adaptability' as a capacity of systems 'to learn, combine experience and knowledge, adjust its responses to changing external drivers and internal processes and continue developing within the current stability domains (…)' and 'transformability' as '(…) the capacity to create a fundamentally new system (…)'. In other words, we have adaptability of regimes and transformability related to regime 'shifts', a transformation from one equilibrium to another. Adaptability and transformability can occur at multiple scales. Sometimes, changes at lower scales (e.g., on critical issues) are needed to preserve the regime as a whole (Folke et al. ) .
,
If we translate these, quite abstract, system-related ideas to the domain of water management and climatic change, the interdependent social-ecological system level would in our case be the English and Dutch society as a whole, whereas the social-ecological subsystem (lower scale) would in general be how flood risk management responds to the natural environment in terms of governance, policy discourse, including the leading governance principles and instruments. Even this subsystem level is too large and complex to tackle in one paper so we confine ourselves to the governance of sea and river floods: a specific but prominent part of subsystem perturbations. As is elaborated in Keessen et al. () , resilience of social systems and related governance is not 'neutral terrain' but is dependent, next to the natural environment, on the political theories underpinning governance systems. These political theories steer and explain policy choices when it comes to adaptation to climatic changes. The question arises: What and who should be resilient? (Carpenter et al. ; Berkhout ) . Political theory guides the way societies think of resilience in relation to governance; there can, in fact, be different types of rationales to contribute to resilience: resilience can be embedded in collective arrangements for the whole of society (e.g., national social security based on solidarity as a resilient institution) or, following a more liberal or even libertarian conception of resilience, communities or individual citizens ought to be more self-dependent and resilient themselves.
Resilience, in short, can be about higher and lower scale elements of systems, and addresses institutions, groups or individuals, largely dependent on the political-theoretical basis of societies and their academic scholars.
Scholars on adaptation often stress diversity, polycentricity and flexibility (e.g., Folke et al. ; Pahl-Wostl ; for a critical discussion see Bakker & Morinville ) of governance and policy strategies. It seems as if the more diverse, polycentric and flexible a social-ecological system is, the more resilient it will be. In our view, however, many resilience and adaptation governance scholars use these ideas as (in fact, normative) templates and ignore the crucial role of the political groundings and deeply embedded governance principles in different societies. In the remainder of this article we try to unravel what often is not made explicit: the rationales behind the specific choices made in flood risk management. We will consider climate change and the adaptation challenge as an external perturbation influencing the policy subsystem. This system can adapt and persist, or transform its governance regime. Often, these responses will not have fully progressed.
To relate the flood risk approaches to the above ideas of resilience theory, we will first describe the overall existing regime (what is the role of state, market or community in flood risk management; who decides on what issues; what are important principles of governance). Then, we characterise contemporary flood risk strategies and discuss institutional changes in both societies, focusing on critical issues of political and societal debate, zooming in on issues of water and spatial planning, multi-layered safety (MLS) and insurance systems. This functions as a way to discuss lower scale practices to see if they relate to larger scale system adaptability and resilience. We will be sensitive to proposed changes in policy concepts, policy discourse, principles and policy instruments that are used. While giving these features, we systematically try to answer the following questions: Who should actually be resilient? Who is mainly responsible for damages? How are considerations made concerning the public interest? This leads to an overview of the typical Dutch and English rationales of resilience.
Our analysis is based on data from different research projects on flood risks and climate change in England (this paper focuses almost exclusively on England due to the increasing differences in flood risk management arrangements among the countries of the UK; although there are some past and existing commonalities) and the Netherlands, both domestically and in a comparative perspective. These include the Dutch Knowledge for Climate Change program, more specifically a work package on normative principles in Dutch climate adaptation policy, where more than 20 interviews were held to describe both the principles and the focus of climate adaptation governance in the Netherlands, next to several smaller contract research projects. The English part was based on the expertise of the Flood Hazard
Research Centre in London, that over the years has conducted a variety of research projects, for example, for European comparative programmes (e.g., Knowledge for Climate, STAR-FLOOD, Floodsite) and domestic research on the English insurance system. Next to this, crucial policy documents were analysed to discover the underlying principles of governance. We thus developed a 'helicopter view' on the flood risk policies in both countries.
EXISTING FLOOD RISK GOVERNANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS AND ENGLAND The Netherlands
The Netherlands is a low-lying delta of four major rivers.
The Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt and the Ems flow 
Dutch policy instruments and principles
Dutch water management is based on integrated long-term strategic planning and mid-term strategic and operational planning. In the national, provincial and regional water plans we find differentiated responsibilities for all governmental authorities. The Water Act contains flood risk safety standards and provides for a system of 6-yearly monitoring (to be changed in a 10-year monitoring cycle) and reporting to the Parliament. These reports are followed by new investments in case the safety standards are not met.
Although certainly not all flood defence works meet the safety standards (currently around 60% meets them), the constant programmatic investment and implementation of dyke improvement programmes has ensured that there were no serious floods in the last 60 years.
The Dutch approach is characterised by the focus on prevention and the high flood safety standards which are established by an Annex to the Water Act. These legal standards determine the acceptable probability of flooding within the dyke rings. Although these standards are set differently for specific regions, they can be regarded as uniform standards because they follow a rationale of evenly spread risks. The west of the country has a 1:10,000 flood risk because of the high economic and social consequences related to the dense population and sudden onset of sea floods that make evacuation proble- By contrast, urban flooding in public urban areas is a municipal responsibility and citizens are responsible for floods in urban areas on their own territory, except when there are such exceptional circumstances that they cannot be expected to take care of their own flood risks. The duty to protect against urban flooding (from rain water, waste water collection systems or groundwater) is less stringently formulated than the responsibilities that rest on the regional water authorities. There are no legal standards and municipalities formulate their policy goals and foreseen measures and investments in a non-binding local plan, thus clarifying the division of responsibilities between the citizens and the municipality.
In addition, municipalities have powers to regulate activities that may influence urban flood risks and they have the power to raise taxes for specific water management tasks.
We conclude that the focus in Dutch flood risk management is therefore on the following leading principles:
'decentralisation, prevention and solidarity' combined with cost recovery and classical democratic institutions for 'public participation', further elaborated and put into practice with the help of powerful legally binding public policy instruments.
England
As part of an island, the runoff and hence river flows experi- 
CRITICAL ISSUES AT THE FRONTIERS OF FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT
In both the Netherlands and England, there are discussions on how to proceed with flood risk safety against the backdrop of increasing risks, climate change as well as changing ideas on governance. In the Netherlands, this was fuelled by the Second Delta Committee (www.deltacommissie.com) and in England this was mostly a response to increasing costly flood events that had great public impact. We will focus here on two critical issues that are illustrating both the dominant approach in each country and the (im)possibilities of changing strategies and underlying institutional change: water management and spatial planning, (including discussions of 'MLS') and insurance systems.
Water management and spatial planning
A universal problem is how to coordinate spatial and water management planning. Historically, it is fair to say that water management was the servant of spatial planning.
Making the 'best' use of land determined how water was managed, with water in an environment being heavily modi- 
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGIES AND RATIONALES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND ENGLAND
As was explained in the Introduction, domestic governance of flood risks reflects both a specific 'division of labour' of state, market and communities, and specific principles that guide societal opinion and political decision-making. Governance approaches thereby reveal certain conceptions of resilience. Below we try to summarise typical characteristics of the approaches in the two countries. In England, the option of acquiring properties and land to take flood risk measures simply because they are at high risk of flooding is not an option. As with the idea that governments should provide compensation to victims of natural or other disasters, the Finance Ministry, HM Treasury, does not accept that this is an appropriate use of public money (DEFRA ) and will consequently not authorise the relevant government department to make such payments (HM Treasury ). These payments seldom occur in the Netherlands either, because damages are preferably prevented instead of recovered afterwards. Table 1 
CONCLUSIONS
In the Introduction we discussed how challenges of climate change and related adaptation are putting pressure on existing governance arrangements and their underlying normative principles. We first gave an overview of the existing governance arrangements while asking such basic questions as 'who decides', 'who should act' and 'who is responsible for flood damage' (see Table 1 ). The answers are fundamentally different. As we have seen, in England, the focus is on the resilience of households, communities or firms in light of the economy as a whole. The Dutch conception of resilience is centred more around maintaining the resilience of the collective, secured by the existing system of flood defences which assures robustness as part of resilience thinking, coupled with state liability in case the water authorities do not fulfil their obligations and the possibility that the state declares a flood event a disaster and pays part of the damage and recovery costs.
However, any comparison will have a tendency to accentuate the differences and overlook the similarities.
One of the interesting surprises of our analysis is that in both countries, there is a centralised state, and flood risk management is treated as a technical problem that is appropriately addressed through a technocratic bureaucracy. But while this is so, the operating principle is again different: in the Netherlands there is a technocracy based on the merit of water expertise and legitimated by a strong idea of a collective public interest. In the terms of Alexander () there is a 'unitary' conception of the public interest.
This leads to a social contract of government being responsible for flood risks and the general public accepting and supporting this idea. In England there also is a technocracy, but this is more part of a general political decision-making process, with responsibilities spread over state, insurance companies, individuals and communities. Consequently, there has been increased focus on property-level measures to reduce individual and community vulnerability. But, again, this is more reflecting path dependencies and confirming existing decision-making than transformational regime shifts.
As a final concluding remark, we can see that flood risk management is, in fact, under pressure in both countries.
The dominant role of the state but also the general principles of solidarity and prevention are not abandoned, but now more critically discussed in the Netherlands and the state, market and community-relationships are heavily debated in England too. In both cases, climate change leads to adaptation as fine-tuning of existing regimes in light of regime persistence rather than regime transformation.
